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______________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
______________ 
 
Baylson, District Judge  
I. Introduction 
 This appeal arises out of a contract dispute between 
VICI Racing LLC (“VICI”), the owner of a sports car racing 
team, and T-Mobile USA, Inc. (“T-Mobile”), a 
telecommunications company that agreed to be a corporate 
sponsor of the sports car team.  Appellant/Cross-Appellee T-
Mobile appeals a $7 million judgment entered against it in the 
District Court for the District of Delaware.  After a bench 
trial, the District Court ruled that T-Mobile breached a 
contract with Appellee/Cross-Appellant VICI and awarded 
VICI $7 million in damages.  On appeal, T-Mobile argues 
that it should not have been held liable for any damages 
arising out of the contract and is instead entitled to damages.  
VICI filed a cross-appeal, seeking an additional $7 million 
pursuant to what it contends is a liquidated damages clause in 
the contract. 
II. Background 
 VICI is the former operator of a sports car racing team 
that competed in the American Le Mans Series.
1
  VICI 
Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 317, 320 
(D. Del. 2013).  T-Mobile owns and operates a wireless 
                                                          
 
1
  The American Le Mans Series is a series of sports 
car races that is sanctioned by the International Motor Sports 
Association.  J.A. 887. 
4 
 
telephone service including automobile-based wireless 
telephone service.  J.A. 887.   
 Beginning in March 2009, VICI President Ron 
Meixner entered into discussions with T-Mobile executives 
about sponsoring the VICI team for the 2009, 2010, and 2011 
Le Mans racing seasons.  VICI Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 
320.  Meixner informed T-Mobile that a “sponsorship would 
be economically valuable for T-Mobile because VICI could 
offer T-Mobile to be the network service provider for the 
VW/Audi Group and Porsche AG Telematics services.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2
  A number of 
discussions were held within T-Mobile about the financial 
opportunities associated with providing telematics services to 
VW, Audi, and Porsche, as well as how the Agreement with 
VICI would secure that business.  See id. at 321-22. 
                                                          
 
2
  The District Court did not make any findings about 
the meaning of the term “telematics” nor did the contract 
define the term.  We note that it has been defined as “[t]he 
branch of science concerned with the use of technological 
devices to transmit information over long distances,” Collins 
English Dictionary (10th ed. 2009), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/telematics, and as 
“refer[ring] to the broad industry related to using computers 
in concert with telecommunications systems.  This includes 
dial-up service to the Internet as well as all types of networks 
that rely on a telecommunications system to transport data.  
The term has evolved to refer to systems used in automobiles 
that combine wireless communication with GPS tracking.  
The term is further evolving to include a wide range of 
telecommunication functions that originate or end inside 
automobiles,” Telematics, WEBOPEDIA,  
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/telematics.html. 
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 A. The Agreement 
 On March 30, 2009, T-Mobile and VICI entered into a 
Sponsorship Agreement (the “Agreement”).  J.A. 894.  The 
Recitals section of the Agreement states that T-Mobile agrees 
to sponsor VICI and that VICI and T-Mobile “desire to 
promote and maintain their respective corporate images and 
reputations through participation in the 2009, 2010 and 2011 
American LeMans race seasons.”  Id. at 887.  The Agreement 
required VICI to field one T-Mobile-sponsored Porsche 
racecar during the 2009 season and two T-Mobile-sponsored 
Porsche racecars during each of the 2010 and 2011 seasons.  
Id. at 887.  The Agreement also required VICI to display T-
Mobile’s logo and trademark on its racecars, trailers, 
uniforms, and other promotional items.  Id. at 888-89. 
 Additionally, section 5.8 of the Agreement provides 
that “VICI grants to [T-Mobile] the right to be the exclusive 
wireless carrier supplying wireless connectivity for the 
Porsche, Audi and VW telematics programs beginning in 
model year 2011 with such exclusivity continuing throughout 
the Term of this Agreement.”  Id. at 888.  The meaning and 
relevance of section 5.8 were a hotly disputed issue at trial. 
 As for T-Mobile, section 4 of the Agreement required 
it to make the following payments to VICI: 
2009 Race Season: $1,000,000.00 payable by 
April 1, 2009;
[3]
 
2010 Race Season: $7,000,000.00 payable by 
January 1, 2010; and 
                                                          
3
  This amount was timely paid by T-Mobile to VICI 
and is not in dispute. 
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2011 Race Season: $7,000,000.00 payable by 
January 1, 2011. 
Id. at 887-88. 
 The Agreement also contains three other provisions 
that are relevant to this appeal.  Section 13.2 of the 
Agreement is a force majeure clause.  According to that 
provision,  
[i]f a party’s performance of any non-monetary 
obligation under this Agreement is prevented by 
any condition wholly beyond such party’s 
control, the affected party will be excused from 
such performance, provided the affected party:  
(a) provides prompt written notice of such 
interference, the nature of such interference and 
the expected duration of such interference to the 
other party; and (b) resumes performing its 
obligations hereunder promptly following the 
removal of such interfering condition.  The 
other party will be relieved from performing its 
obligations under this Agreement for the 
duration of such interference.  Such delay or 
failure shall not constitute a breach of this 
Agreement . . . . 
Id. at 893. 
 Section 14.7 of the Agreement is a severability clause, 
which provides 
[t]he provisions of this Agreement are severable 
and, if any one or more provisions are 
determined to be illegal or otherwise 
unenforceable, in whole or in part, the 
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remaining provisions, and pay partially 
enforceable provisions to the extent 
enforceable, shall nevertheless be binding and 
enforceable, and such illegal or otherwise 
unenforceable provisions shall be replace[d] by 
such valid provisions which come closest to the 
purpose and intent of this Agreement  
Id. at 893. 
 Finally, section 11 of the Agreement has a provision 
under the heading “Limitation of Liabilities.”  Section 11.2 of 
that provision provides in all capital letters 
[t]he maximum aggregate liability of either 
party and any of its affiliates to the other party, 
and the exclusive remedy available in 
connection with this agreement for any and all 
damages, injury, losses arising from any and all 
claims and/or causes of action, shall be limited 
to $20,000 or the aggregate payments payable 
under this agreement, whichever is higher . . . . 
Id. at 892 (some capitalization omitted). 
B. The “Telematics” Collaboration 
As the District Court’s findings of fact detail, 
beginning in April 2009, Meixner worked with T-Mobile to 
secure “telematics” business from VW, Audi, and Porsche.  
For example, Meixner helped set up meetings for T-Mobile 
with the President and CEO of Porsche Motorsports North 
America, provided the contact information of fifteen “key 
people in telematics” at VW, VICI Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 
325 (citation omitted), and helped pitch T-Mobile’s services 
at a meeting with VW.  Id. at 324-26.  T-Mobile, however, 
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complained that things were “moving a little slower than [it] 
would like.”  Id. at 325 (citation omitted). 
 C. The Accident 
 On July 18, 2009, T-Mobile’s sponsored racecar 
sustained engine and body damage from an accident while 
racing.  Id.  On August 2, 2009, Meixner sent a letter to T-
Mobile’s President and legal department notifying them about 
the accident.  In the letter, Meixner stated that the racecar 
would not be able to race for 45 to 60 days while it was 
undergoing repairs.  A T-Mobile executive responded by 
expressing his displeasure that the repairs would mean guests 
of T-Mobile would not see the T-Mobile racecar compete in 
an upcoming race.  Id. 
 D. Termination of the Agreement 
 On January 5, 2010, Meixner sent T-Mobile a notice of 
default, indicating that T-Mobile had failed to pay the $7 
million due under the Agreement by January 1, 2010.  Id. at 
327.  On January 7, 2010, T-Mobile sent a letter to Meixner 
terminating the Agreement, claiming that VICI materially 
breached the contract because 
VICI made a material representation and 
warranty (Section 5.8) that VICI had the 
authority to bind Audi, VW and Porsche . . . to 
an obligation making [T-Mobile] the exclusive 
wireless carrier supplying wireless connectivity 
for the . . . telematics programs beginning in 
model year 2011.  As it turns out . . . VICI does 
not have and has never had the authority to 
grant such rights . . . or to contractually bind 
Audi and VW in that regard. . . . VICI has not 
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provided any other real support to T-Mobile to 
assist us in meeting that objective. 
In addition, we note that VICI failed, without 
justification or prior notice to [T-Mobile], to 
race . . . at one key event where [T-Mobile] was 
present with business guests. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 E. Proceedings in the District Court 
 On September 30, 2010, VICI filed suit in the District 
of Delaware against T-Mobile, claiming that T-Mobile 
breached the Agreement when it failed to pay VICI 
$7 million on January 1, 2010 and seeking $14 million in 
damages.  T-Mobile asserted, as an affirmative defense and 
counterclaim, that VICI did not perform its obligations under 
the contract (1) by failing to race during the period the T-
Mobile-sponsored car was damaged and (2) by failing to 
provide T-Mobile with telematics business to three 
automakers.  T-Mobile also alleged fraudulent inducement 
and equitable fraud against VICI. 
 Prior to trial, the parties filed a “joint proposed pretrial 
order.”  This document is divided into several sections where 
each party listed its own statement of disputed facts, disputed 
issues of law, and a statement of what the parties intended to 
prove.  Id. at 78.   
 At the bench trial, VICI’s evidence and contentions on 
damages were exclusively dedicated to the argument that 
section 11.2 was a liquidated damages clause that fixed the 
amount of damages at $14 million.  T-Mobile did not contest 
VICI’s characterization of section 11.2.  It also did not assert 
as an affirmative defense, nor argue at trial, that VICI failed 
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to mitigate its damages.  Rather, T-Mobile relied on the 
argument that section 5.8 (the telematics provision) was an 
essential term of the Agreement—that is, if section 5.8 was 
found to be unenforceable, then the entire Agreement would 
be unenforceable.  Because the Agreement would be 
unenforceable without section 5.8, T-Mobile argued that this 
conclusion required the District Court to award it damages in 
quantum meruit.  T-Mobile also argued that it had been 
fraudulently induced into entering the Agreement by VICI’s 
representation that it had the authority to secure telematics 
business from VW, Audi, and Porsche.
4
 
On February 11, 2013, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of VICI.  In a comprehensive opinion 
accompanying its judgment, the District Court made detailed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  It determined that T-
Mobile breached the Agreement by failing to make the 
obligatory payment of $7 million on January 1, 2010.  VICI 
Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 334.  It also concluded that section 
5.8 was ambiguous on its face and that parol evidence did not 
resolve the ambiguity.  Id. at 328-29.  According to the 
District Court’s findings of fact, before the final Agreement 
was signed, Robert Hines, T-Mobile’s inside counsel, spoke 
with Meixner about section 5.8.  According to Meixner’s 
testimony, during that conversation the T-Mobile official 
explained that section 5.8 only meant “that T-Mobile is 
exclusive to [VICI] and that [VICI] cannot shop this around 
and get—promote any other wireless carriers, and that was 
it.”5  Id. at 324.  The District Court reached clear findings that 
                                                          
4
  The District Court rejected T-Mobile’s fraudulent 
inducement argument.  T-Mobile does not appeal that ruling. 
 
5
  The quoted testimony is arguably contrary to T-
Mobile’s arguments in this litigation.  There was clearly 
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the language of section 5.8 is “too convoluted to have any one 
clear meaning,” is “fairly susceptible of different 
interpretations,” could “have two or more different 
meanings,” and that “an examination of the rest of the 
contract reveals no other provisions that in any way 
illuminate the language contained in section 5.8.”  Id. at 326.  
In reaching this finding, the District Court rejected T-
Mobile’s argument that it only entered the contract because of 
its understanding of section 5.8.  Id. at 328.  Specifically, the 
Court concluded that even if it were “to assume the veracity 
of T-Mobile’s subjective understanding [of section 5.8], the 
evidence of record does not support that this subjective 
understanding was ‘objectively manifested’ to VICI or that 
VICI knew or should have known of it.”  Id. at 331.  The 
Court then severed section 5.8 pursuant to section 14.7 (the 
severability provision) of the Agreement.  Id. at 330.   
In response to T-Mobile’s argument that VICI first 
breached the contract, the Court concluded that, although 
VICI did not meet its obligation to race for the entire 2009 
season, that failure was excused under the Agreement’s force 
majeure provision (section 13.2) because the racecar had been 
damaged in an accident and VICI had provided notice to that 
effect.  Id. at 332. 
 With respect to damages, the Court awarded VICI 
expectation damages of $7 million for T-Mobile’s breach of 
contract.  Id. at 334.  In support of this award, the Court found 
that VICI had relied upon receipt of the $7 million payment to 
pay for expenses remaining from the 2009 season and to pay 
for preparation costs for the 2010 season.  Id.  
                                                                                                                                  
conflicting testimony on the intent of the parties as to the 
contractual language. 
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Though this issue was not raised by the parties, the 
District Court also concluded that VICI had a responsibility to 
mitigate its damages after T-Mobile sent its termination 
notice by, for example, attempting to find a substitute primary 
sponsor for the 2010 and 2011 seasons.  Id.   The Court thus 
refused to award the second $7 million payment to VICI, 
observing in a footnote that it would not award VICI $14 
million pursuant to section 11, which it described as a “quasi 
liquidated damages provision,” because that amount was 
“unreasonably large” and would constitute an unenforceable 
“penalty,” or “windfall.”  Id. at 334 n.22. 
Both parties appealed the District Court’s judgment. 
III. Jurisdiction 
 VICI’s complaint invoked federal diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Because T-Mobile is a corporation, 
it is a citizen of its state of incorporation and where it 
maintains its principal place of business.  Zambelli Fireworks 
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010).  T-
Mobile was incorporated in Delaware and maintains its 
principal place of business in the State of Washington.  It 
therefore is a citizen of both Delaware and Washington for 
diversity purposes.  Because VICI is a limited liability 
company, it is a citizen of any state in which its members are 
citizens.  Id. at 418 (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC is 
determined by the citizenship of its members.”).  VICI’s sole 
member is Ron Meixner, who is a citizen of Florida.  VICI is 
thus a citizen of Florida for diversity purposes.  The amount 
in controversy is $14 million.  Because the parties are diverse 
and the amount in controversy is over $75,000, we have 
subject matter jurisdiction over this case.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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IV. Standards of Review 
On appeal from a bench trial, our court reviews a 
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its 
conclusions of law de novo.  McCutcheon v. Am.’s Servicing 
Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009).  For mixed questions 
of law and fact “we apply the clearly erroneous standard 
except that the District Court’s choice and interpretation of 
legal precepts remain subject to plenary review.”  Gordon v. 
Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 201 (3d Cir. 2005).  “To the 
extent that the District Court’s conclusions rested on 
credibility determinations, our review is particularly 
deferential.”  Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
609 F.3d 143, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).  A finding of fact 
is clearly erroneous when it is “completely devoid of 
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility or bears no rational relationship to the supportive 
evidentiary data.”  Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 369 
F.3d 745, 754 (3d Cir. 2004).   
With respect to damages, we review de novo “whether 
the district court applied the appropriate measure of contract 
damages in a legal sense.”  Id. 
V. Liability 
A. T-Mobile’s Contentions 
As noted above, the District Court found that section 
5.8 of the Agreement was unenforceable and severed the 
provision.  As an initial matter, we note that T-Mobile does 
not appeal the District Court’s finding that section 5.8 was 
14 
 
ambiguous and, therefore, unenforceable.
6
  Rather, T-Mobile 
appeals only the District Court’s decision to sever section 5.8 
from the Agreement and to enforce the remainder of the 
Agreement.  T-Mobile argues that the Court erred by severing 
section 5.8 because it failed to analyze whether section 5.8 
was essential to the Agreement as a whole, as required by 
Delaware law.   
Specifically, T-Mobile argues that Delaware law 
required the District Court to consider whether severance was 
consistent with the intention of the contracting parties.  It 
claims that the Court did not analyze the parties’ intent on 
whether they would have signed the Agreement without the 
severability provision, and instead relies solely on the fact 
that the Agreement included a severability clause.  T-Mobile 
also contends that the presence of the clause in the Agreement 
may be indicative, but is not conclusive, of the parties’ intent 
with respect to severability.  As a result, it argues that the 
record supports a finding by this Court of reversible error 
because the record shows that the parties would not have 
                                                          
 
6
  The District Court applied the correct legal 
principles in reaching its determination that the provision was 
ambiguous.  After determining that the provision was 
ambiguous on its face, the Court then considered parol 
evidence to try to ascertain the parties’ intentions.  This 
approach is approved by the Supreme Court of Delaware.  See 
GMG Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners, I, 
L.P., 36 A.3d 776 (Del. 2012) (“Where a contract is 
ambiguous, the interpreting court must look beyond the 
language of the contract to ascertain the parties’ intentions.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  The District Court, 
acting as factfinder, considered the relevant parol evidence, 
but concluded that the extrinsic evidence did not resolve the 
ambiguity.   
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entered the Agreement without an enforceable telematics 
provision. 
Additionally, T-Mobile points to the second half of the 
severability provision, which states that, where any provision 
of section 11 is severed, it “shall be replace[d]” with a 
provision that “come closest to the purpose and intent of this 
Agreement.”  J.A. 893.  By not replacing the severed 
provision with a provision that addressed the same purpose 
and intent of the severed clause, T-Mobile posits that the 
District Court erred. 
T-Mobile further contends that the Court erred by 
finding that the force majeure provision of the contract 
excused VICI’s breach by failing to race in several races in 
2009 following a crash that damaged VICI’s racecar.  T-
Mobile claims that VICI only relied upon its own economic 
limitations when insisting that it could not race another car, 
and also that the District Court erred by not inferring a 
foreseeability requirement into the force majeure provision.
 
 
In its pretrial statement, T-Mobile at no time mentioned 
foreseeability as a required element for implementation of the 
force majeure clause on the contract.  See id. 78. 
B. VICI’s Contentions 
VICI contends that the District Court attempted to 
interpret section 5.8 according to its plain terms, giving 
priority to the parties’ intentions, but ultimately found the 
provision to be ambiguous.  Continuing with this contention, 
it argues that the Court then appropriately considered 
extrinsic evidence, but found that it did not clarify the 
meaning of the provision.   
As part of the evaluation of extrinsic evidence, VICI 
suggests that the District Court rejected T-Mobile’s 
16 
 
interpretation of section 5.8 as not credible and found that, 
even if T-Mobile’s interpretation was held in good faith, T-
Mobile never conveyed that understanding to VICI such that 
VICI knew or should have known of it.   
VICI also argues that the District Court’s decision to 
sever section 5.8 and enforce the remainder of the Agreement 
should also be affirmed.  It maintains that the District Court 
properly found that (1) the severability clause of the 
Agreement showed that the parties clearly intended to enter a 
severable Agreement, (2) the remainder of the Agreement 
was enforceable, and (3) the record did not support T-
Mobile’s characterization of section 5.8 as integral to the 
Agreement. 
Finally, VICI disputes the argument that the District 
Court ignored the second part of the severability clause, 
which provided that a severed provision would be replaced 
with a valid provision that “comes closest to the purpose and 
intent of this Agreement.”  J.A. 893.  According to VIC, the 
Court considered and attempted to replace the severed 
provision, but found that the ambiguity of section 5.8 
prevented it from ascertaining section 5.8’s relationship to the 
“purpose and intent of th[e] Agreement.”  Id. 888. 
VICI also argues that the District Court properly 
applied the force majeure provision of the contract to excuse 
VICI’s own breach.  In VICI’s view, T-Mobile conflates the 
economic hardship experienced after a force majeure event 
with the force majeure event itself, as (1) VICI could not have 
foreseen the damage to the car or the steps that it would need 
to take to repair that damage, and, in any event, (2) T-Mobile 
waived all of its appellate arguments on damages.   
We review below the parties’ contentions on VICI’s 
cross-appeal in which VICI asserts the District Court erred in 
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refusing to award damages for the full $14 million damages it 
claimed in this case. 
C. The District Court Did Not Err in Severing 
Section 5.8 and Enforcing the Remainder of 
the Contract  
Delaware law is clear that “[a]n invalid term of an 
otherwise valid contract, if severable, will not defeat the 
contract.”  Hildreth v. Castle Dental Ctrs., Inc., 939 A.2d 
1281, 1283-84 (Del. 2007).  Thus, “a court will enforce a 
contract with an indefinite provision if the provision is not a 
material or essential term.”  Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272, 
275 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding a contract could not be enforced  
due to its failure to specify minimum compensation for 
performance); see also Hindes v. Wilmington Poetry Soc’y, 
138 A.2d 501, 503 (Del. Ch. 1958) (declaring contract invalid 
and noting that while it is true that “material provisions of an 
agreement can be so indefinite that the agreement will not be 
enforced,” “it is equally true that a court will not upset an 
agreement where the indefinite provision is not an essential 
term”).  Having decided that section 5.8 was too ambiguous 
to enforce, the District Court then considered whether the 
ambiguity of section 5.8 defeated the contract as a whole. 
The inquiry turns on the parties’ intentions.  Orenstein 
v. Kahn, 119 A. 444, 445 (Del. 1922) (noting that whether a 
contract is severable is a question of the intent of the parties).  
“Delaware courts recognize that the parties’ intent to enter 
into a divisible contract may be expressed in the contract 
directly, through a severability clause.”  Doe v. Cedars Acad., 
LLC, No. 09C-09-136, 2010 WL 5825343, at *4 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 27, 2010) (severing provision of contract and 
enforcing remainder of contract, including forum selection 
clause) (citations omitted).  
18 
 
If a court finds that the parties intended a contract to be 
severable, it must then determine whether the remaining 
terms of the contract are sufficiently definite that the 
agreement can be enforced, since “[a] contract must be 
reasonably definite in its terms to be enforceable.”  
Scarborough v. State, 945 A.2d 1103, 1112 (Del. 2008)  
(holding that trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
consider terms of oral agreement between parties); see also 
Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2004) (“In 
Delaware, as in most jurisdictions, a court will not enforce a 
contract that is indefinite in any of its material and essential 
provisions.”); Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Schlegel Elec. 
Materials, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463 (D. Del. 2008) 
(granting motion to enforce settlement agreement and 
explaining that a contract contains all essential terms and is 
therefore enforceable when “it establishes the heart of the 
agreement”). 
The severability clause in the Agreement is clear and 
reflects the parties’ intentions that unenforceable provisions 
would be severed from the contract and the remaining 
provisions would be enforced.  To repeat, in pertinent part, 
the Agreement states: 
The provisions of this Agreement are severable 
and, if any one or more provisions are 
determined to be . . . unenforceable, . . . the 
remaining provisions . . . shall nevertheless be 
binding and enforceable, and such illegal or 
otherwise unenforceable provisions shall be 
replace[d] by such valid provisions which come 
closest to the purpose and intent of this 
Agreement. 
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J.A. 893.  As the District Court recognized, this provision “is 
a clear manifestation of the parties’ intention to create a 
contract wherein any unenforceable provisions would not 
destroy the entire agreement.”  Id. at 24.  Moreover, the 
Agreement contained sufficiently definite terms that it could 
be enforced.  Id. 
T-Mobile argues that the District Court did not 
determine whether section 5.8 was essential to the 
Agreement.  It is unclear whether T-Mobile argues that 
section 5.8 is essential as evidence that the parties did not 
intend for the provision to be severable or to show that, 
without section 5.8, the Agreement cannot be enforced 
because it no longer reflects the essential terms of the parties’ 
agreement.  Nevertheless, the contention fails. 
As for the first contention, the Court clearly found the 
severability provision to be unambiguous.  VICI Racing, 921 
F. Supp. 2d at 330.  As discussed above, we find no error in 
the Court’s conclusion.  As for the second contention, that the 
remaining terms of the contract could not be enforced, we 
also find no error.  Although it did not frame its analysis in 
those terms, the Court clearly rejected T-Mobile’s argument, 
offered both on appeal and at trial, that it only entered the 
Agreement to gain telematics business from various 
automakers.  Indeed, the Court concluded that “although T-
Mobile has repeatedly asserted that it entered into the 
sponsorship only to gain the telematics business[,] . . . this 
intention is not reflected in the four corners of the 
agreement.”  Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
support of this conclusion, “[t]he recitals state the purpose of 
the contract is to sponsor a[ ] . . . racecar” and that “[t]he 
sponsorship contract in question is eight pages long and 
contains over 300 lines of text . . . [in which] the word 
telematics is used only one time, in a three line provision 
(section 5.8) with no indication that this provision was the 
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bedrock of the deal for T-Mobile.”  Id. (emphasis added) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
7
  Another 
reason supporting this conclusion is the failure of the parties 
to define telematics or to include, in the contract, any term 
stating that the provision of telematics was part of VICI’s 
obligation. 
Thus, the District Court properly determined that the 
parties intended to sever unenforceable contractual terms 
from the contract and that the telematics provision was not an 
essential term of the Sponsorship Agreement and properly 
dealt with the remaining contractual terms. 
Nor do we find persuasive T-Mobile’s argument that 
the District Court erred by not replacing the severed provision 
of section 5.8 with another provision that “comes closest to 
the purpose and intent of the Agreement” per the severability 
provision in the Agreement.  J.A. 893.   In light of the 
unresolvable ambiguity as to the meaning of section 5.8 and 
the lack of any discussion of telematics in any other part of 
the Agreement, the Court could not possibly have conjured 
another provision that would “come[ ] close to the purpose 
and nature of the Agreement” with respect to telematics.8  
                                                          
7
  Although the District Court went on to consider 
parol evidence to determine the meaning of the section, doing 
so did not contradict or undercut the conclusion that the 
telematics provision was not essential to the parties’ 
contractual formation.   
 
 
8
 T-Mobile also argues that the District Court failed to 
consider the apportionment of consideration—that is, failed to 
determine whether the contract permitted apportionment of 
the consideration to certain promises.  We reject this 
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D. The District Court Did Not Err in Finding 
That the Force Majeure Provision Excused 
VICI’s Breach  
Having determined that the District Court properly 
severed section 5.8 and enforced the remainder of the 
Agreement, we next turn to the question of whether the 
Agreement’s force majeure provision excused VICI’s failure 
to enter a racecar into several races in 2009.  It determined 
that the provision did excuse VICI’s breach.  T-Mobile 
contests that conclusion. 
A force majeure clause defines an area of events that 
might excuse nonperformance within the contract period.   
Gulf Oil Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 706 F.2d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(citing United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 
123-24 (1943)) (holding that a Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission order constituted  legal error on force majeure 
issue and discussing difference in application of force 
majeure clauses in warranty and non-warranty context).  As 
the District Court noted, “[a]s a general matter, ‘[f]orce 
majeure clauses are . . . drafted to protect a contracting party 
from the consequences of adverse events beyond that party’s 
control.”  VICI Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (quoting 
Stroud v. Forest Gate Dev. Corp., Case Nos. Civ.A.20063-
NC and Civ.A.20464-NC,  2004 WL 1087373, at *5 (Del. 
Ch. May 5, 2004) (unpublished) (rejecting occurrence of 
force majeure event where real estate developer “encountered 
problems with groundwater which interfered with 
construction of the foundation” because “that [] is not what 
caused [the developer] to miss its contractual performance 
                                                                                                                                  
argument in light of the fact that the Agreement contains a 
severability provision that reflects the parties’ intention to 
allow certain unenforceable provisions of the contract to be 
severed without concern for apportionment of consideration. 
22 
 
date; it missed that date because it had not previously moved 
diligently”). 9   As with all contractual interpretation, 
however, a court must determine the intent of the parties from 
the contractual language.  Stroud, 2004 WL 1087373, at *5 
n.25. 
The District Court found that the car accident 
constituted a force majeure under the terms of the Agreement, 
and observed: 
Turning to section 13.2 of the agreement, the 
force majeure provision at issue may be 
invoked if three conditions are met: (1) the 
prevented obligation is a nonmonetary 
obligation that is prevented by a condition 
beyond a party’s control; (2) the affected party 
provides prompt notice of the interference, its 
nature, and expected duration; and (3) 
performance of the prevented obligation 
resumes as soon as the interference is removed.  
[]Turning to the facts, the obligation that 
was prevented in this case was certainly a non-
monetary one; VICI was prevented from racing 
                                                          
 
9
 Unpublished opinions of Delaware courts may be 
cited in Delaware, although not as binding precedent.  See 
Oglesby v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 896 n.2 
(D. Del. 1994) (“Unpublished orders of the Delaware 
Supreme Court have precedential effect in Delaware.”); 
Appellate Handbook Comm. of the Del. Supreme Court Rules 
Advisory Comm., Delaware Appellate Handbook, at 8-vi 
(1996) (“Under Supr. Ct. R. 17(a), unpublished orders of the 
Supreme Court may now be cited as precedent, as well as 
unpublished orders and opinions of the lower courts.”). 
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because of damage to the racecar sustained in 
an accident at the Lime Rock race.  Two weeks 
after the VICI racecar sustained damage, 
Meixner faxed a notice to T-Mobile’s president 
and legal department explaining that the car 
would be out of commission for 45 to 60 days.  
VICI resumed racing in October 2009 at Mazda 
Raceway Laguna Seca. 
[]T-Mobile argues that VICI improperly 
invoked the force majeure provision of the 
agreement because the interference that 
prevented VICI from racing was a financial one.  
The court need not address T-Mobile’s legal 
arguments on this basis because its contention is 
factually inaccurate. . . . The interference was 
the damage sustained in the accident at the 
Lime Rock race. The fact that money can solve 
a problem does not mean that a lack of money 
caused the problem. The court finds that VICI's 
failure to race the T-Mobile Le Mans car at four 
races was not a breach of contract because 
Meixner adhered to the force majeure 
procedures outlined in section 13.2 of the 
agreement. 
VICI Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (citations 
and footnotes omitted). 
T-Mobile argues, as it did before the District Court, 
that VICI’s force majeure argument impermissibly relies on 
economic hardship, which cannot excuse performance under 
Delaware law.  In support of this contention, T-Mobile points 
out that a VICI representative testified that VICI could have 
raced in the next race following the accident if it had been in 
a healthier financial condition.  As such, T-Mobile contends 
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that a mere increase in expense does not constitute a force 
majeure.  
As the District Court correctly recognized, T-Mobile 
misinterprets the force majeure law regarding economic 
hardship.  The law makes clear that reasonable, unextreme 
economic hardship cannot constitute a force majeure itself.  
However, the force majeure—as recognized by the District 
Court—was not an economic hardship but rather an 
automobile crash.  Id. (stating that the condition preventing 
performance “was the damage sustained in the accident at the 
Lime Rock race”).  Thus, the only case law relied upon by T-
Mobile has no present bearing since it merely supports the 
general proposition that financial hardship itself does not 
constitute a condition excusing performance under a force 
majeure provision.  
1. Foreseeability as Requisite for Force 
Majeure to Excuse Non-Performance 
T-Mobile also argues that VICI failed to prove that the 
condition preventing performance—the damage to the 
racecar—could not have been foreseen at the time the parties 
entered the Agreement.  It contends that there was no 
evidence in the record suggesting that the automobile crash 
and the subsequent damage caused by it could not have been 
foreseen and thus that the force majeure provision does not 
apply.  VICI responds that neither the type of damage to the 
car, the type of repairs needed as a result of that damage, nor 
the lack of parts available to do those repairs, could have been 
foreseen.   
As a preliminary point, we note that the force majeure 
provision in the Agreement imposes three conditions—that 
“(1) the prevented obligation is a nonmonetary obligation that 
is prevented by a condition beyond a party’s control; (2) the 
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affected party provides prompt notice of the interference, its 
nature, and expected duration; and (3) performance of the 
prevented obligation resumes as soon as the interference is 
removed”—none of which mention foreseeability.  VICI 
Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  Nevertheless, some courts 
have inferred such a condition even where the contract makes 
no mention of it.   
However, because T-Mobile did not raise the 
foreseeability issue below, see, e.g., J.A. 78, it may not secure 
appellate relief on this issue.  In re Diet Drugs 
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 706 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2013).  “It is axiomatic that 
arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to 
be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in 
this court absent exceptional circumstances.”  Tri-M Grp., 
L.L.C. v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This waiver rule serves several 
important judicial interests, such as “protecting litigants from 
unfair surprise; promoting the finality of judgments and 
conserving judicial resources; and preventing district courts 
from being reversed on grounds that were never urged or 
argued before them.”  Id. (alternation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Because T-Mobile did not present the 
foreseeability argument to the District Court, we deem it 
waived.   
Even if T-Mobile had not waived the foreseeability 
argument, we would be required to predict how the Delaware 
Supreme Court would rule on this question, since that Court 
has yet to address the issue.  The only Delaware court to 
address the topic is the Court of Chancery in Stroud.  There, 
the Chancery Court interpreted a contract for the acquisition 
of two townhouses in the process of being built.  The contract 
included a force majeure clause that enumerated several types 
of events that would fall within the provision’s scope, but also 
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included a catch-all phrase:  “or any other reason whatsoever 
beyond the control of” the party.  Stroud, 2004 WL 1087373, 
at *5.  The real estate developer argued that the force majeure 
clause excused its performance due to a series of delays 
caused by the inspection and rejection of the water detention 
pond and delays in obtaining the final County approval.  Id. at 
*6-7.  The Chancery Court rejected these arguments, noting 
that such delays were “almost inevitable in the real estate 
development setting” and that “every event that, in some 
sense, ‘delays’ progress is not the meat of a force majeure 
clause.”  Id. at *5, *7.  In light of those considerations, the 
Court reasoned that, 
[u]ltimately, the most likely expectation of the 
parties to the Agreement [was] that the force 
majeure clause encompasses two concepts:  
first, that the delay-causing event was beyond 
the reasonable control of [the development 
company] and, second, that the event was not 
reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course of 
real estate development. 
Id. at *5.   
At no point did the Court in Stroud suggest that all 
force majeure clauses must be read to incorporate the concept 
of foreseeability.  Rather, the Chancery Court engaged in 
standard contractual analysis to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties, and found that, given the nature of the 
real estate industry, the parties expected the clause to include 
such a concept. 
Other courts have found that contractual force majeure 
provisions that do not discuss whether the excusing event 
must be unforeseeable should be construed to require 
unforseeability.  Indeed, in Gulf Oil Corp., 706 F.2d at 453, 
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this Court considered a force majeure provision in a gas 
warrant contract and observed that:   “To support a definition 
of force majeure in a warranty contract, we must stress the 
element of uncertainty or lack of anticipation which 
surrounds the event’s occurrence and must affect the 
availability and delivery of gas.”  Id.  In reaching the result, 
we expressly rejected petitioner’s argument “that the contract 
terms are to protect the parties from both foreseeable and 
unforeseeable events.”  Id.  Again, the opinion made much of 
the specific circumstances of the gas industry, even stating 
that “[o]ur decision is based on the contract’s daily warranty.”  
Id. at 453.   
There is some rationale to suggest that a racecar crash 
during a competitive car race, as the mechanical breakdowns 
and maintenance repairs at issue in Gulf, should not constitute 
a force majeure because “their frequent, almost predictable, 
occurrence takes them outside of a force majeure excuse to 
non-performance.”  Id. at 454.  Nevertheless, because the 
Agreement does not expressly incorporate a non-
foreseeability condition into its terms and because T-Mobile 
did not raise the issue at the trial level, we decline to reach the 
issue here.  It would be ill-advised to wade into the uncharted 
waters of Delaware state law without a fully developed record 
on the issue at the trial level.
10
  For example, there are facts in 
                                                          
10
 The Court notes that certain arguments by VICI 
suggest that the parties were aware of the possibility of a 
racecar accident and the consequences that would result.  In 
VICI’s opening statement, counsel stated that Ron Meixner 
explained to T-Mobile representatives that “if we have one 
car and the car has a problem, we can be out of racing for a 
while.”  J.A. 142.  Counsel additionally argued that, after the 
accident, Mr. Meixner then told T-Mobile:  “I told you this 
would be a problem.”  J.A. 145. 
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the record to suggest that T-Mobile did not notify VICI that it 
considered the failure to race to constitute a breach and did 
not terminate the contract upon VICI’s failure to breach, 
which might suggest either that T-Mobile deemed the non-
performance to be either non-material or excused by the force 
majeure provision.   
Moreover, the application of the waiver doctrine here 
serves to protect at least the three judicial interests noted 
above: “protecting [VICI] from unfair surprise; promoting the 
finality of judgments and conserving judicial resources; and 
preventing district courts from being reversed on grounds that 
were never urged or argued before them.”  Tri-M Group, 
LLC, 638 F.3d at 416 (alternation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
Because a factual record on this line of argument was 
not developed, and in view of the judicial interests that the 
waiver doctrine is designed to protect, the most prudent 
course of action is to deem the foreseeability issue waived.  
Therefore, we affirm the District Court’s findings on this 
issue.  The consequences of this holding are discussed below 
in the context of VICI’s cross-appeal.   
VI. Liquidated Damages 
T-Mobile claims that the District Court erred when it 
awarded $7 million to VICI based on T-Mobile’s failure to 
make the 2010 payment.  It argues that by awarding the full 
2010 payment amount the District Court failed to properly 
apply the principles of expectation damages.
11
  VICI, in its 
                                                          
 
11
  T-Mobile also argues that the District Court should 
have awarded T-Mobile, not VICI, damages under a quantum 
meruit theory.  Because we hold that there was a binding 
contract between the parties, T-Mobile’s argument fails.  See 
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cross-appeal, claims that the District Court erred when it 
declined to award $7 million for T-Mobile’s failure to make 
the 2011 payment.  VICI argues that section 11.2 of the 
Agreement is a liquidated damages clause that precludes the 
District Court from awarding anything other than $14 million 
to VICI—that is, the total amount that T-Mobile failed to pay 
under the Agreement. 
 We first address VICI’s contention that section 11.2 of 
the Sponsorship Agreement was a liquidated damages clause, 
for a finding in VICI’s favor on this point would moot any 
further discussion of damages. 
The District Court characterized section 11.2 as a 
“quasi liquidated damages provision.”  VICI Racing, 921 F. 
Supp. 2d at 334 n.22.
12
   It went on to note that, if it awarded 
the second $7 million payment as liquidated damages, then 
that award would be “unreasonably large” and thus 
“unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”  Id.  
We review a district court’s construction of a contract de 
novo.  Ram Constr. Co., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 
1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Construction, which may be 
                                                                                                                                  
Chrysler Corp v. Airtemp. Corp., 426 A.2d 845, 853-54 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1980) (summary judgment) (“With respect to the 
theory of quantum meruit or contract implied by law, courts 
of this State have long recognized that recovery on such a 
theory will be considered only if it is determined that the 
relationship of the parties is not governed by an express 
contract.”).   
 
 
12
  As an initial matter, we disagree with the District 
Court’s implied adoption of a “quasi liquidated damages” 
doctrine because under Delaware law a provision either calls 
for liquidated damages or it does not. 
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usefully distinguished from interpretation, is a process by 
which legal consequences are made to follow from the terms 
of the contract and its more or less immediate context . . . . 
When construction of a contract is the issue before an 
appellate court, the question is one of law and freely 
reviewable.” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
 In Delaware, “[c]ontract law allows parties to establish 
only a good faith estimation of actual damages sustained as a 
result of a contract's termination.”  Del. Bay Surgical Servs., 
P.C. v. Swier, 900 A.2d 646, 650 (Del. 2006).  This good 
faith estimation is known as liquidated damages. 
Liquidated damages are a sum to which the 
parties to a contract have agreed, at the time of 
entering into the contract, as being payable to 
satisfy any loss or injury flowing from a breach 
of their contract. It is, in effect, the parties’ best 
guess of the amount of injury that would be 
sustained in a contractual breach, a way of 
rendering certain and definite damages which 
would otherwise be uncertain or not easily 
susceptible of proof.    
Id. (quoting S.H. Deliveries, Inc. v. Tristate Courier & 
Carriage, Inc., Case No. 96C-02-086-WTQ, 1997 WL 
817883, at *6-8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 1997)). 
 To determine whether a contractual provision is one 
for liquidated damages, Delaware courts ask whether the 
provision unambiguously demonstrates the parties’ intention 
to set a fixed amount to be paid in the event of breach.  See 
Ballenger v. Applied Digital Solutions, Inc., Case No. 
Civ.A.19399, 2002 WL 749162, at *12 (Del. Ch. April 24, 
2002) (noting that creation of a liquidated damages provision 
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“must have been the unambiguous intention of the contracting 
parties”); PSL Air Lease Corp. v. E.B.R. Corp., Case Nos. 
757-Civ.A.1970 and 758-Civ.A.1970, 1974 WL 173050, at 
*3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 1974) (“Because the lease 
provision does not clearly and unambiguously fix an amount 
to be paid as damages[,] the clause is not a liquidated 
damages clause.”).  A term is ambiguous when the provision 
is “reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations 
or may have two or more different meanings.”  Rhone-
Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 
1192, 1196 (Del. 1992). 
 Section 11 of the Agreement, entitled 
“Limitation of Liabilities,” provides: 
 
11.1 Even if either party . . . has been advised of 
the possibility of damages, they will not be 
liable to the other party. . . for any damages . . . 
including without limitation: special, indirect, 
incidental, punitive, consequential, or treble 
damages; loss of privacy damages[,] personal 
injury or property damages; or any damages 
whatsoever resulting from the transactions 
contemplated under this agreement. 
 
11.2 The maximum aggregate liability of either 
party . . . and the exclusive remedy available in 
connection with this agreement for any and all 
damages, injury, losses arising from any and all 
claims and/or causes of action, shall be limited 
to $50,000 or the aggregate payments payable 
under this agreement [$14 million], whichever 
is higher. . . . 
 
J.A. at 892 (emphases added and some capitalization 
omitted).   
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 VICI claims that sections 11.1 and 11.2 operate 
together to limit recoverable damages (section 11.1) and 
specify the exact liquidated remedy (section 11.2).  
According to its interpretation, section 11.1 prohibits “any 
damages whatsoever” while section 11.2 provides the 
“exclusive remedy”:  $50,000 or the amount remaining on the 
contract, whichever is higher.  VICI also relies on a 
survivorship clause in the Agreement that provides that 
section 11 “survive[s] any termination of this Agreement for 
any reason” as additional support for its interpretation.  Id. 
 We are not persuaded that section 11.2 is a liquidated 
damages clause.  First, section 11’s heading reads “Limitation 
of Liabilities,” not “Liquidated Damages.”  Although a 
provision’s heading is not dispositive to the analysis, Donegal 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Plex Sec. Alarm Sys., 622 A.2d 1086, 
1089 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992), the remainder of section 11.2 is 
replete with language that establishes that this clause is 
indeed a liability limitation provision.  First, section 11.2 sets 
the “maximum aggregate liability” under the contract.  
Limiting the maximum liability does not set a fixed sum, as 
required under Delaware liquidated damages law; it merely 
erects a damages ceiling.  Second, the provision states that 
any and all damages “shall be limited”—words that 
communicate an unmistakable intention to limit liability, not 
set a fixed sum.  Finally, the payments contemplated by the 
provision also fail to set a fixed sum.  Instead, it calls for a 
payment of $50,000 or the “aggregate payments payable 
under the agreement, whichever is higher.” 
 The structure of the rest of the Agreement also 
supports the conclusion that section 11.2 was not intended to 
provide liquidated damages.  A liquidated damages provision 
is permitted when the damages from a breach would 
otherwise be difficult to predict or calculate.  Del. Bay 
Surgical Servs., P.C., 900 A.2d at 651.  The payment 
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schedule set forth in section 4 of the Agreement, however, 
makes it clear what damages VICI could expect to incur in 
the event of a breach.
13
  Section 11’s limitation- of-liability 
language, when read together with section 4, clearly sets the 
maximum possible damages available to VICI.  Accordingly, 
it makes little sense to construe a clause to be a liquidated 
damages provision when damages are relatively easy to 
calculate by reference to the Agreement. 
 As VICI recognizes, section 11.2 does use the phrase 
“exclusive remedy,” which could suggest that the provision 
contemplates a liquidated remedy.  The better reading of 
those words, however, is that T-Mobile’s liability is limited to 
                                                          
13
  For the sake of convenience, we set out this 
provision again: 
 
4. FEES AND MARKETING SUPPORT 
 
4.1 [T-Mobile] agrees to pay VICI the 
following sponsorship fees during the 
Initial Term: 
 
2009 Race Season: $1,000,000.00 
payable by April 1, 2009; 
 
2010 Race Season: $7,000,000.00 
payable by January 1, 2010; and 
 
2011 Race Season: $7,000,000.00 
payable by January 1, 2011. 
 
J.A. at 887-88. 
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paying $50,000 or the remainder owed under the contract, 
whichever is higher.  As we have discussed, these payment 
possibilities essentially reiterate the expectations of the 
parties under the contract and thus do not provide for 
liquidated damages.  Moreover, even if the words “exclusive 
remedy” would support a liquidated damages reading, the 
remainder of section 11.2 would be ambiguous at best.  Under 
Delaware law, a liquidated damages clause must be 
unambiguous.  Ballenger, 2002 WL 749162, at *12.  We 
therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment not to construe 
the Agreement to provide a liquidated damages remedy. 
VII. The District Court’s Damages Calculation for the 
2010 Payment  
 Because section 11.2 is not a liquidated damages 
provision, we turn to whether the District Court properly 
awarded expectation damages under the contract.  
We note at the outset that T-Mobile failed to raise any 
issue related to damages in its pretrial statement, J.A. 78, or at 
trial.  After the Court issued its judgment, T-Mobile could 
have filed a motion for a new trial or a motion to set aside the 
judgment on the ground that the damages award was 
excessive, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.  It 
did neither.  Accordingly, T-Mobile did not preserve any 
argument about damages for appeal.  See Brenner v. Local 
514, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“It is well established that failure to raise an issue in 
the district court constitutes waiver of the argument.”).  Even 
if T-Mobile’s arguments were properly before the Court, we 
find that they lack merit. 
 Review of the District Court’s damages calculation is a 
mixed question of law and fact.  The determination of what 
legal standard to apply when calculating damages, and 
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whether that standard was properly applied, are questions of 
law.  The determination of facts upon which to apply this 
legal standard is a question of fact.  Accordingly, we “must 
accept the trial court’s findings of historical or narrative facts 
unless they are clearly erroneous, but we must exercise 
plenary review of the trial court’s choice and interpretation of 
legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the 
historical facts.”  Univ. Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 
669 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1981).   
In assessing the damages that resulted from this 
breach, the District Court bifurcated its analysis, addressing 
the damages incurred from the failure to make the 2010 and 
2011 payments separately.  We structure our analysis along 
similar lines.  This section, part VII, focuses on the District 
Court’s $7 million damages award based on T-Mobile’s 
failure to make the 2010 payment under the agreement.  Part 
VII.A.1 concludes that the District Court used the proper 
legal standard when calculating damages for the 2010 
payment.  Part VII.A.2 concludes that it did not err in 
applying this standard with regard to VICI’s losses and the 
costs it avoided as a result of T-Mobile’s breach.  Parts 
VII.B.1 and VII.B.2 discuss the nature of mitigation damages 
as an affirmative defense.  Part VII.B.3 concludes that the 
District Court did not err in calculating VICI’s 2010 damages 
without regard to mitigation because T-Mobile waived that 
affirmative defense.  Part VIII addresses the ruling of the 
Court regarding the 2011 payment and concludes that the 
Court applied the wrong legal standard in reaching its 
conclusions.  Part IX briefly concludes. 
 A. Expectation Damages 
T-Mobile claims that the District Court failed to apply 
“any legally-recognized measure” of damages.  Appellant’s 
Initial Br. at 41.  It also claims that the Court failed to deduct 
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the actual costs avoided by VICI as a result of T-Mobile’s 
breach and failed to deduct the costs that VICI could have 
avoided through reasonable mitigation efforts.   
1. The District Court Used the Proper 
Legal Standard to  Determine VICI’s 
Damages Regarding the 2010 Period 
We first review whether the District Court used the 
proper legal standard in awarding expectation damages.  
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347, 
expectation damages are calculated by (1) the loss to the non-
breaching party (2) plus any loss, including incidental or 
consequential loss, caused by the breach (3) less any cost or 
other loss that the non-breaching party avoided by not having 
to perform.  In other words, “expectation damages is 
measured by the amount of money that would put the 
promissee in the same position as if the promisor had 
performed the contract.”  Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 
1019, 1022 (Del. 2001) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 347 cmt. a). 
Expectation damages may not be speculative.  When 
establishing the loss the non-breaching party incurred as a 
result of the breach, a plaintiff must “‘lay a basis for a 
reasonable estimate of the extent of his harm, measured in 
money.’”  Emmet S. Hickman Co. v. Emilio Capaldi 
Developer, Inc., 251 A.2d 571, 573 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) 
(quoting 5 Corbin on Contracts, 125 Pt. 6, Ch. 56 § 1020).  
Additionally, a plaintiff may only recover those damages that 
were foreseeable or likely to follow from the breach of an 
agreement.  McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Del. 
1977).   
 Once the loss attributable to nonperformance has been 
determined, a court must subtract any costs avoided as a 
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result of the breach that are evident in the record.  
WaveDivision Holdings, LLC v. Millennium Digital Media 
Sys., L.L.C., Case No. 2993-VCS, 2010 WL 3706624, at *19-
20, *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010) (“[Plaintiff] is only entitled 
to recover the net loss it has suffered because of 
[Defendant’s] breach.”).  A court must also reduce the 
calculated damages by the amount of loss “‘that [the plaintiff] 
could have avoided by reasonable efforts.’”  W. Willow-Bay 
Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, Case No. 2742-
VCN, 2009 WL 458779, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2009) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. b).   
T-Mobile claims that the District Court awarded VICI 
$7 million for the 2010 period without applying any legally-
recognized measure of damages.  We disagree.  The District 
Court recited the proper standard, including the requirement 
to reduce damages by the amount of actual costs avoided:  
Generally, “the non-breaching party is entitled 
to recover ‘damages that arise naturally from 
the breach or that were reasonably foreseeable 
at the time the contract was made.’  Contract 
damages ‘are designed to place the injured party 
in an action for breach of contract in the same 
place as he would have been if the contract had 
been performed. Such damages should not act 
as a windfall.’”  Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, 
LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 146–47 (Del. 2009) 
(citations omitted); Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 
775 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2001) (citing 
Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 347). 
Further, damages should be reduced by costs or 
other loss avoided by the non-breaching party.  
See Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 350.  
“[A] party may avoid costs by suspending its 
own performance when confronted with breach 
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and avoid loss by making substitute 
arrangements.”  West Willow–Bay Court, LLC 
v. Robino–Bay Court Plaza, LLC, No. 2742–
VCN, 2009 WL 458779, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
23, 2009) (citing Restatement (Second) Of 
Contracts § 350 cmt. b (“Once a party has 
reason to know that performance by the other 
party will not be forthcoming, he is ordinarily 
expected to stop his own performance to avoid 
further expenditure.”)).  Also, a party may not 
generally recover damages for losses that it 
could have avoided by reasonable efforts.  Id. 
(citing Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 
350 cmt. b).  Thus, the injured party has a duty 
to mitigate or minimize its costs and losses.  Id. 
(citing Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 
350 cmt. b) (noting that “the injured party is 
under no obligation to [mitigate], although it 
will not be awarded damages for any loss that 
could be avoided”). 
VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 
317, 333 (D. Del. 2013). 
2. The District Court Did Not Err in 
Applying the Proper Damages 
Standard or Clearly Err in Finding 
Facts to Support Its Damages Award 
for the 2010 Period Regarding Actual 
Costs Avoided 
 T-Mobile next argues that the District Court did not 
properly apply the correct legal standard to the facts in the 
record because it failed to subtract the costs VICI avoided by 
not racing in 2010. 
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 In applying the expectation damages standard, the 
District Court made findings about what VICI expected to 
gain from T-Mobile under the contract.  The Court looked to 
the language of the sponsorship agreement, as the best 
evidence of the expectations of the parties, to find that VICI 
expected to receive $7 million in 2010.  Id. at 344; see also 
Eagles Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 
1228, 1232 (Del. 1997) (“Contract terms themselves will be 
controlling when they establish the parties’ common meaning 
so that a reasonable person in the position of either party 
would have no expectations inconsistent with the contract 
language.”).  Section 4 of the Sponsorship Agreement clearly 
delineates the monetary payments that VICI expected to 
receive and that T-Mobile expected to pay.  See supra note 
13.  Based on the timing of T-Mobile’s breach, section 4’s 
payment schedule supports the District Court’s finding that 
VICI expected to receive a $7 million payment on January 1, 
2010. 
 The Court then made affirmative findings about the 
expenses and losses that VICI incurred as a result of the 
breach.  For instance, it credited Meixner’s testimony that a 
normal budget for a car was $5 million, though the bottom 
line was $2.5 million.  VICI Racing, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  
It also found that VICI incurred losses in the 2009 season to 
help make up for the underfunded 2009 budget T-Mobile 
provided that year, although VICI offset some of these 
expenses with additional sponsorships.  Id.  It found that VICI 
incurred additional expenses to pay for the damaged racecar 
in 2009.  Id. at 334.  And it found that VICI incurred 
expenses in 2009 to help prepare for the 2010 season.  Id. 
 The District Court’s citations to the record provide 
substantial support for finding that VICI incurred losses and 
costs as a result of the breach.  These costs included loans to 
float the team in 2009 that VICI expected to repay with the 
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2010 payment, J.A. 391-93 (cited by the District Court at 
VICI, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 334)
14
; the costs of repairing the car 
in 2009, id. at 395 (cited by the District Court at VICI, 921 F. 
                                                          
14
 Counsel (Q): But you had a car? 
 Meixner (A): I had a car. 
 Q:    And you had equipment, correct? 
 A:     Yes. 
 Q:    And you had assets? 
 A:    Yes. 
Q:    And you had a house that your wife and             
children lived in; correct? 
 A:    Yes. 
Q:    You had all of these things.  And where did 
the money come from to go between a million and 
two-and-a-half million? 
A:    From us and from—we borrowed money and 
all kinds of things. 
Q:    And all the various amounts that Mr. Lowery 
was discussing that you owe this money and that 
money and this judgment, that judgment— 
 A:    Yes. 
Q:    —the mortgage foreclosure against your 
house? 
 A:    Yes. 
Q:    All because you didn’t have enough money to 
do this deal? 
 A:    Yes. 
 Q:    Why did you do it? 
A:    Because I know I’m going to get a payment in 
January of 2010. 
 
J.A. 391-393. 
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Supp. 2d at 334)
15
; and the costs of preparing to race for 
2010, id. at 415 (cited by the District Court at VICI, 921 F. 
Supp. 2d at 334).
16
   
 Despite these testimony excerpts and findings, T-
Mobile claims that the District Court erred by failing to make 
findings regarding the actual costs avoided by VICI and by 
                                                          
15
 Q:    Okay.  Did you pay for the engine from                                       
Porsche? 
 A:    Yes. 
 Q:    Did you pay for all the repairs to the car? 
 A:    Yes. 
 Q:    And the car actually ran again, didn’t it? 
 A:    Yes.  And it ran perfectly. 
Q:    So whatever you had to do to scrape together 
the money to run the car, you did? 
 A:    We did. 
 
J.A. 395. 
 
16
 Q:    Okay, What if anything, did you do with        
respect to requirements under the contract between 
October 9th of 2009 and January 5th of 2010? 
A:    Well, we were preparing for the next—for the 
new season. 
Q:    Could you explain to the Court what you did? 
A:    Well, we ordered another trailer because it was 
going to be two cars next year.  And we had new staff 
on standby, because we tried some other people.  And 
I had ordered two Porsches from Porsche, for two race 
cars. 
 
J.A. 415. 
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failing to deduct those costs from VICI’s damages award.  T-
Mobile cannot prevail on these arguments.  First, it made 
none of these arguments in its pretrial statement, J.A. 78, 
during the trial, in post-trial briefing, id. at 1339 and 1414, or 
in post-trial motions.  Second, although the District Court did 
not expressly state that costs were actually avoided, what 
those avoided costs were, or whether those costs were offset 
by VICI’s losses as a result of the breach, not expressly 
making these findings is not a reason to reverse or remand. 
 T-Mobile argues that because the District Court 
awarded VICI $7 million—the same amount that VICI would 
have received in 2010 had T-Mobile performed under the 
contract—it therefore failed to deduct the actual costs VICI 
avoided by not racing in 2010.  Although the Court did not 
make express findings about the actual costs avoided by not 
racing, T-Mobile is incorrect in asserting that it failed to 
apply the proper damages standard.   
 As quoted supra Part VII.A.1, the District Court 
correctly identified—and thus was well aware of—its duty to 
deduct actual costs avoided from its damages calculation.  
The better reading of the Court’s opinion is that it implicitly 
concluded that any actual costs avoided were offset by other 
losses VICI incurred. 
 The District Court did not conclude that VICI was 
entitled to damages based on the contract alone.  The fact that 
it considered the additional losses suffered by VICI over the 
course of 2009 and 2010 indicates that it considered gains and 
losses in addition to the gross revenue VICI anticipated 
receiving from T-Mobile under the contract.  By taking the 
time to cite examples of these losses, and then awarding VICI 
$7 million, the Court implicitly found that there were no costs 
avoided relative to the losses incurred by VICI as a result of 
the breach.  See W. Willow-Bay Court, 2009 WL 458779, at 
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*4 (“Damages are awarded in an amount equal to the loss in 
value occasioned by the defendant’s nonperformance.”); 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 (stating that a 
party’s expectation interest includes “the loss in value to him 
of the other party’s performance caused by its failure . . . plus 
any other loss . . . caused by the breach . . . .) (emphasis 
added).   
 In view of the fact that T-Mobile never raised this 
issue pre-trial, never argued to the District Court at trial that 
VICI actually avoided costs, and never objected post-trial to 
the Court’s analysis, the Court was under no obligation to 
make a specific finding about costs avoided—that is, it did 
not have to expressly find that the actual costs avoided were 
offset by VICI’s losses.  The Court fully discussed the 
expenses and losses VICI incurred in attempting to fulfill the 
contract.  See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.  
Implicit in these findings is the conclusion that the costs 
avoided by VICI not racing in 2010 did not warrant a 
reduction in the damages award, given the expenses and 
losses sustained by VICI.  A trial court’s findings are 
sufficient if the affirmative facts found by it, construed as a 
whole, negate a rejected contention.  Rayonier, Inc. v. Polson, 
400 F.2d 909, 923 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Bowles v. Cudahy 
Packing Co., 154 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir. 1946) (“The trial 
court is not required to make findings on all the facts 
presented and need only find such ultimate facts as are 
necessary to reach the decision in the case.  The judgment 
should stand if the opinion below gives the appellate court a 
clear understanding of the basis of the decision.” (internal 
quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)).  The 
District Court’s affirmative findings dispensed with the need 
to expressly find that the costs that were actually avoided 
were not greater than the losses incurred by VICI as a result 
of the breach.  Accordingly, it did not commit legal error in 
calculating VICI’s damages regarding actual costs avoided. 
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 Next, the District Court did not commit clear error in 
its fact-finding when it determined that the actual costs 
avoided by VICI were offset by its losses. 
 There is evidence in the record that VICI actually 
avoided certain costs—namely, VICI avoided the costs 
associated with racing in 2010.  As discussed above, the 
question that the District Court implicitly answered was that 
the losses suffered by VICI were offset by the actual costs 
avoided.  There is no precise indication in the record as to 
how much money was spent in 2009 and 2010 to fund the 
2009 season and prepare for the 2010 season.  Similarly, there 
is no precise indication in the record as to what costs were 
actually avoided by not racing.  All the record makes clear is 
that there were some losses incurred and some costs avoided.  
To that extent, there is no precise evidence in the record as to 
whether VICI actually experienced a loss greater than its 
expected gain from the contract and the costs it avoided by 
not racing in 2010.   
 “Fact finding does not require mathematical certainty.”  
Schulz v. Pa. R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956).  Because the 
District Court is not required to rule with mathematical 
precision, because T-Mobile ignored the damages issue 
below, and because VICI introduced evidence as to both the 
losses it incurred and the costs it avoided in 2010, the Court’s 
implicit finding that any actual costs avoided were offset by 
VICI’s losses need not be disturbed.  “[I]t is the very essence 
of the trial court’s function to choose from among the 
competing and conflicting inferences and conclusions that 
which it deems most reasonable.”  Evans v. United States, 
319 F.2d 751, 755 (1st Cir. 1963).  Accordingly, “an appellate 
court has no power to disturb a finding of fact of a trial court 
where it is based on some substantial though conflicting 
evidence.”  Id. at 753; see also Frederick v. United States, 
386 F.2d 435, 435 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Upon conflicting evidence 
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the district court found that the appellant had not established 
this factual claim. That finding was permissible and we 
sustain it.”).   
 Whatever our own views of the evidence, whether we 
believe that the actual costs avoided warrant a reduction in 
the $7 million award or not, it is not our charge to remand to 
the District Court to perform a recalculation based on a 
difference of opinion.  See Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil and 
Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766, 770 (3d Cir. 1968) (“In reviewing 
the decision of the District Court, our responsibility is not to 
substitute findings we could have made had we been the fact-
finding tribunal; our sole function is to review the record to 
determine whether the findings of the District Court were 
clearly erroneous, i.e., whether we are ‘left with a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” (quoting 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1949)) 
abrogated on other grounds by Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck 
Corp., 372 A.2d 736, 739-751 (Pa. 1977).   
 Based on a review of the record, it is clear that, not 
only were the District Court’s findings free from clear error, 
they were supported by substantial evidence.  Accordingly, 
we cannot question the District Court’s award any more than 
we could question an award made by a jury.  Indeed, if the 
District Court had instructed a jury on the damages standard 
recited in its opinion; and a jury had reviewed the evidence in 
the record; and upon that review the jury determined that a 
$7 million award was appropriate, the jury award would be 
impervious to appellate second-guessing.  Given the evidence 
in the record, we are obliged to afford the District Court 
similar deference. 
 Specifically, this Court can only find error in a district 
court’s factual finding if it is “completely devoid of minimum 
evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility” or 
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unless it “bears no rational relationship to the supportive 
evidentiary data.”  Berg Chilling Sys., 369 F.3d at 754 
(citations omitted).  Based on the record citations in the 
District Court’s opinion, we cannot say that the District Court 
clearly erred.  Its finding—albeit implicit—is not completely 
devoid of minimum evidentiary support and bears a rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.  For these 
reasons, we have no power to disturb that finding and reject 
T-Mobile’s contentions to the contrary. 
B. Mitigation of Damages 
1. The Breaching Party Has the Duty to 
Mitigate Damages  
First year law students are generally taught that a 
plaintiff claiming breach of contract himself has a duty to 
mitigate.  11 Corbin on Contracts, § 57.11 (1993) (“It is not 
infrequently said that it is the ‘duty’ of the injured party to 
mitigate damages so far as can be done with reasonable 
effort.”).   However, that maxim has a corollary: “[t]he 
burden of proving that losses could have been avoided by 
reasonable effort and expense must always be borne by the 
party who has broken the contract.”  Id.   
Delaware law is consistent.  Although there is no 
specific precedent from the Delaware Supreme Court or this 
Court applying Delaware law, lower Delaware courts and the 
District Court of Delaware consistently apply Delaware law 
to conclude mitigation is an affirmative defense.  Moreover, 
we have been unable to find any cases to the contrary.  See 
Stinson v. Edgemoor Iron Works, 53 F. Supp. 864, 868 (D. 
Del. 1944) (concluding, in the absence of clear Delaware 
Supreme Court authority, Delaware would follow the general 
weight of authority and hold that “the burden of pleading and 
proving mitigation of damages is upon the defendant”); 
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Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law 
of Contracts: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 Drake L. 
Rev. 177, 241 (2009) (“[T]he overwhelming weight of 
authority states that the breaching promisor must prove that 
the promisee inappropriately failed in avoiding or alleviating 
his injury.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 The Supreme Court of Delaware has held that a “party 
has a general duty to mitigate damages if it is feasible to do 
so.”  Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1367 (Del. 1995) 
(remanding on whether mitigation was reasonable).  “[B]ut 
whether mitigation is required depends upon the 
circumstances of the case and is subject to a rule of 
reasonableness.”  Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 
497, 504 (Del. 1981) (citations omitted) (reversing judgment 
for the defendants after a bench trial because the lower court 
incorrectly found failure to mitigate) overruled on other 
grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 
1983).  Mitigation is a limitation on the plaintiff’s ability to 
recover damages that could have been avoided.  W. Willow-
Bay Court, LLC, 2009 WL 458779, at *4 (observing that, as 
“a general rule, a party cannot recover damages for loss that 
he could have avoided by reasonable efforts,” and finding 
after a damages trial that the plaintiff made reasonable, 
although unsuccessful, effort to mitigate (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. b)).   
 But this mitigation is a burden of conduct, not a burden 
of proof at trial.  Conway v. Hercules Inc., 831 F. Supp. 354, 
359 (D. Del. 1993) (finding in a pre-trial order that 
“[d]efendant asserts plaintiff must show he mitigated his 
damages with ‘reasonable diligence,’ but in so asserting . . . 
defendant confuses the duty with the burden.” (citation 
omitted)).  A plaintiff must prove damages, and a defendant 
may show those damages should be limited because the 
plaintiff failed to take reasonable mitigating measures.  
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Tanner v. Exxon Corp., Case No. 79C-JA-5, 1981 WL 
191389, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. July 23, 1981) (denying the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the 
defendant did not plead mitigation and produced no evidence 
its theory of mitigation was feasible).  The party asserting the 
limitation bears the burden of proof.  Id.   
2. Failure to Mitigate is an Affirmative 
Defense 
 Numerous Delaware Superior Court cases and District 
Court of Delaware cases have held failure to mitigate is an 
affirmative defense.  Route 40 Holdings v. Tony’s Pizza & 
Pasta Inc., Case No. 10c-03-057, 2010 WL 2161819, at *1 
(Del. Super. Ct. May 27, 2010) (dismissing the defendant’s 
counterclaim for failure to mitigate because “[c]ourts often 
refer to this concept as a ‘duty to mitigate,’ [but] technically it 
is not a duty because there are no damages for breach of the 
duty” and therefore is a defense to be pled in the defendant’s 
answer) (internal quotations omitted); Tanner, 1981 WL 
191389, at *4 (“Failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative 
defense, and the burden of proving the failure falls upon the 
defendant.”); O’Riley v. Rogers, Case No. S08C-07020RFS, 
2011 WL 3908404, at *2-3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2011) 
(applying Tanner to personal injury cases in denying the 
defendant’s motion for a new trial based on failure to 
mitigate); Munro v. Beazer Home Corp., Case No. U608-03-
081, 2011 WL 2651910, at *8 (Del. C.P. June 23, 2011) (in a 
post-trial opinion on allocation of damages the court found 
“Delaware recognizes the affirmative defense of failure to 
mitigate damages”); Conway, 831 F. Supp. at 359 (“The 
mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense.”).  Since it is 
an affirmative defense, the breaching party bears the burden 
of proof.  Conway, 831 F. Supp. at 359 (“[T]he burden of 
proving plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages falls squarely 
on defendant.”); Stinson, 53 F. Supp. at 868 (“The general 
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authority—and, in fact, the almost universal weight of 
authority—is that the burden of pleading and proving 
mitigation of damages is upon the [breaching party].”).17 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also looks to 
the breaching party to show that a substitute transaction was 
available.  Restatement (Second) Contracts § 350 cmt. c.  It 
states that “damages are not recoverable for loss that the 
                                                          
 
17
 This Court has consistently held the breaching party 
bears the burden to show failure to mitigate in cases applying 
the law of other states.  Glenn Distributors Corp. v. Carlisle 
Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he party 
who has breached the contract or caused the loss has the 
burden of showing the losses could have been avoided 
through the reasonable efforts of the damaged party.” 
(emphasis omitted) (Pennsylvania law)); Koppers Co., Inc. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1448 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“Mitigation is an affirmative defense, so the burden of 
proving a failure to mitigate is on the defendant.”); Fashauer 
v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 
1288 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding the burden of proof “falls on the 
wrongdoer to show that the damages were lessened or might 
have been lessened by the plaintiff”) (discussing Jones v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 1986)); 
Kutner Buick, Inc. v. Am. Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 620 
(3d Cir. 1989) (reversing because the trial court incorrectly 
imposed the burden to “include in the [damages] calculation 
all offsets which would be proper mitigation of damages” on 
the plaintiff); S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Warner Co., 576 
F.2d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The burden of proving that 
losses could have been avoided by reasonable effort and 
expense must be borne by the party who has broken the 
contract.”). 
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injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden 
or humiliation.”  Id. § 350(1).  The commentary explains “the 
burden is generally put on the party in breach to show that a 
substitute transaction was available. . . .”  Id. § 350 cmt. c.  
Several Delaware courts have cited to section 350 
approvingly in addressing the duty to mitigate.  See, e.g., 
Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1026 nn.22-23 (Del. 
2001) (answering a certified question on the proper measure 
of damages); John Petroleum, Inc. v. Parks, Case No. 06C-
10-039, 2010 WL 3103391, at *6 (Del. Super. June 4, 2010) 
(adopting the commissioner’s report and recommendation 
that the plaintiff took reasonable measures to mitigate), aff’d, 
Parks v. John Petroleum, Inc., 16 A.3d 938 (Del. 2011); W. 
Willow-Bay Court, LLC, 2009 WL 458779, at *8 & n.51. 
When considered in the context of litigation, it follows 
that a defendant must show failure to mitigate.  A plaintiff has 
the burden of proving damages.  Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, 
LLP, 974 A.2d at 146-47 (affirming summary judgment for 
the defendant).  But a plaintiff does not need to plead 
mitigation efforts.  Stinson, 53 F. Supp. at 868.  Rather, the 
defendant must plead failure to mitigate in its answer.  Route 
40 Holdings, 2010 WL 2161819, at *1 (explaining failure to 
mitigate is an affirmative defense available to a defendant in a 
contract dispute and is properly pled as a defense in the 
defendant’s answer); Tanner, 1981 WL 191389, at *4 (“[I]t is 
necessary for the defendant to specially plead plaintiff’s 
failure to mitigate damages.”). 
Thus, once a plaintiff proves its damages, a defendant 
has the burden to show the damages award should be limited 
because the plaintiff failed to take reasonable measures to 
mitigate its loss.  W. Willow-Bay Court, LLC, 2009 WL 
458779, at *8 (finding the plaintiff was entitled to the full 
expectation damages it had shown because the defendant’s 
theory of mitigation was not reasonable).  This inquiry 
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considers whether mitigation was feasible, what measures to 
limit damages were reasonable under the circumstances, and 
whether the plaintiff took sufficient measures to mitigate.  
Brzoska, 668 A.2d at 1367 (holding mitigation is required “if 
it is feasible to do so”); Lynch, 429 A.2d 497, 504 
(“[W]hether mitigation is required depends upon the 
circumstances of the case and is subject to a rule of 
reasonableness.”); Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d 569, 573 
(3d Cir. 1943) (affirming a jury verdict for the defendants’ 
counterclaim, because “one is not required to go through the 
motions of attempting to avoid damages when it is certain 
that they will prove of no avail”).  A defendant need not 
provide an accounting of the costs a plaintiff should have 
avoided, but the burden is properly on a defendant to 
articulate the actions that would have been reasonable under 
the circumstances to mitigate loss.  Collier v. Leedom Const. 
Co., 84 F. Supp. 348, 350-52 (D Del. 1949).   
As with other affirmative defenses, a plaintiff cannot 
anticipate and answer all of the possible theories of 
mitigation.  A defendant must put a plaintiff on notice as to 
what measures the defendant believes were reasonable under 
the circumstances but the plaintiff failed to take.  Cf. Lynch, 
429 A.2d at 505 (finding the mitigating measures the 
defendant asserted were unreasonable).   
This principle is consistent with “the usual rule that the 
burden of proof rests upon him who alleges . . . .”  Murphy v. 
T. B. O’Toole, Inc., 87 A.2d 637, 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1952) 
(citing 2 Jones Civil Evidence (Horwitz ed.) § 192 in granting 
summary judgment to the defendants); see also Del. Coach 
Co v. Savage, 81 F. Supp. 293, 296 (D. Del. 1948) (finding 
for the defendant after a bench trial because “[t]he burden of 
proof rests upon the party asserting the affirmative of an 
issue”).  Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
Commentary provides that “the burden is generally put on the 
52 
 
party in breach to show that a substitute transaction was 
available . . . .”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 
cmt. c.   
Accordingly, we must follow the Delaware cases 
holding that failure to mitigate is an affirmative defense and 
that a defendant bears the burden of proof to show a 
plaintiff’s damages should be reduced on that basis.  
Affirmative defenses not raised in litigation are waived.  Abdi 
v. NVR, Inc., 945 A.2d 1167 n.6 (Del. 2008) (affirming the 
district court’s jury instruction because the issue was tried by 
consent but observing that “[g]enerally, if a defendant does 
not plead an affirmative defense, he or she waives that 
defense” (quoting Kaplan v. Jackson, Case No. 90C-JN-6, 
1994 WL 45429, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 1994))). 
3. T-Mobile Waived the Failure to 
Mitigate Defense 
T-Mobile did not raise failure to mitigate in its 
pleadings or in its pre-trial Statement of Disputed Legal 
Issues.  See J.A. 84-96.  It did not offer any argument or 
evidence regarding failure to mitigate at trial.  T-Mobile was 
in breach of contract but did not present any evidence or 
argument as to what measures VICI should have or could 
have taken to limit its loss but failed to take.  The District 
Court did not make any findings about T-Mobile’s failure to 
plead or raise failure to mitigate.  The record is undisputed 
that T-Mobile did not raise this issue at any time during trial, 
and thus it waived its failure to mitigate damages defense. 
 The District Court, however, concluded that VICI had 
a responsibility to mitigate its damages and had the burden of 
presenting evidence of its efforts to do so.  Finding that VICI 
had failed to satisfy this burden, the Court decided that it 
would not award damages related to the 2011 payment.  In 
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other words, the District Court’s handling of the mitigation 
issue was confined to the 2011 payment.  We address the 
District Court’s reasoning on that score in detail in Part VIII 
below.  For the purposes of reviewing the 2010 award, 
however, it suffices to say that the District Court did not have 
to consider whether VICI failed to mitigate its damages or 
adjust the 2010 damages award based on that consideration.  
It therefore did not err when it limited its calculation of the 
2010 damages award to the losses VICI incurred and the costs 
it avoided as a result of the breach by T-Mobile. 
VIII. The District Court’s Damages Calculation for the 
2011 Payment  
 As previously discussed, the Agreement provides that 
VICI would be entitled to an additional $7 million for its 
services under the contract during the 2011 racing season.
18
  
VICI asserts in its cross appeal, as it did in its complaint and 
at trial, that it was entitled to the second $7 million due in 
2011. 
 At trial, VICI relied exclusively on the argument that 
the liquidated damages provision of the Agreement required 
the District Court to award the second $7 million.  In 
rejecting this argument, the Court observed that “VICI had a 
responsibility to mitigate damages.”  VICI Racing, 921 F. 
Supp. 2d at 334.  It then stated that  
VICI did not present evidence as to its efforts to 
mitigate T-Mobile’s breach by trying to find a 
primary sponsor for the 2010 and 2011 seasons.  
                                                          
18
  As discussed supra, VICI did not race a car that 
season due to damage the car sustained in a crash, although 
that nonperformance was excused by the force majeure 
provision.   
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Awarding the second $7 million, due by 
January 1, 2011, would provide VICI with an 
unfair windfall.  
Id.  The Court then elaborated on this conclusion in a 
footnote, where it observed that even if it found section 11.2 
to be a liquidated damages clause, or a “quasi-liquidated” 
damage clause, “having the second $7 million payment 
survive the breach would render the liquidated damages 
‘unreasonably large’ and ‘unenforceable on grounds of public 
policy as a penalty.’”  Id. n.22 (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 356). 
 Although we affirm the District Court in rejecting 
VICI’s argument that section 11.2 is a liquidated damages 
clause, the reasoning is problematic.  We have already 
rejected the Court’s characterization of section 11.2 as a 
“quasi-liquidated damages” clause.  See supra note 12.  
Additionally, the Court’s analysis misapplied three distinct 
legal concepts: (1) the duty to mitigate; (2) penalty; and (3) 
windfall.   
 The District Court committed two legal errors in its 
mitigation analysis.  First, it improperly placed the burden on 
VICI to present evidence that it took reasonable efforts to 
mitigate its losses.  As discussed supra Part VII.B.1, the party 
asserting a limitation on a damages award bears the burden of 
proof.  Second, the Court erred when it conducted a 
mitigation analysis in the first place—for T-Mobile waived 
that basis for reducing damages by not pleading it as an 
affirmative defense.  As discussed supra Part VII.B.2, the 
failure to mitigate is an affirmative defense, and an 
affirmative defense that is not pled is waived, Abdi v. NVR, 
Inc., 945 A.2d 1167 n.6 (Del. 2008). 
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The District Court also erred when it stated that 
awarding damages for the 2011 payment would render the 
award a penalty.  We have not found any case under 
Delaware law applying the concept of a penalty outside the 
liquidated-damages context.  Since we hold that section 11.2 
is not a liquidated damages clause, any award that may be 
granted as a result of T-Mobile’s failure to make the 2011 
payment is not a penalty.  See PSL Air Lease Corp., 1974 WL 
173050, at *2-3 (declining to address defendant’s argument 
that the purported liquidated damages clause would operate as 
a penalty after holding that the clause was not a liquidated 
damages clause). 
 Finally, the District Court did not properly support its 
conclusion that awarding the second $7 million would result 
in an unfair windfall.  Delaware courts use the term 
“windfall” to describe any damage amount in excess of a 
party’s expectation interest. 
See Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 974 A.2d at 146-47 
(denying damages to terminated employee because doing so 
would award him double compensation); Henkel Corp. v. 
Innovative Brands Holdings, LLC, Case No. 3663-VCN, 2013 
WL 396245, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (denying 
plaintiff recovery for both the difference in sale price between 
time of breach and time of eventual sale and lost income 
because doing so would put plaintiff in better position than it 
would have been had the contract been performed); Council 
of Unit Owners of Sea Colony E. v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs., 
Inc., 564 A.2d 357, 362-63 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding 
that cost of repair was the correct measure of damages for 
breach of construction contract and did not constitute windfall 
even though the full cost of repair would extend the useful 
life of the buildings beyond the amount reasonably 
anticipated at the time of contract).  
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 Other jurisdictions maintain a similar concept of 
windfall.  In Ed Miller & Sons, Inc. v. Earl, the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska considered an appeal from a trial court 
judgment in favor of a lessor for unpaid rent and the projected 
cost of repairing a parking lot.  502 N.W.2d 444, 450 (Neb. 
1993).  The Court held that the repair cost of the parking lot, 
rather than the diminished value, was the correct measure of 
damages.  It noted that the repair costs provided a reasonably 
accurate measure and would not constitute a windfall to the 
lessor.  Id. at 451. 
 Similarly, in Old Stone Corp. v. United States, the 
United States Court of Claims discussed windfall in an 
opinion following a trial on damages.  63 Fed. Cl. 65, 96 
(2004), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 450 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2006).  It considered whether restitution would be the proper 
measure of damages.  In particular, the Court noted that the 
relevant question regarding windfall “is whether an award of 
restitution would place the [plaintiff] in an overall better 
position than if the breach of contract had not occurred.”  Id. 
(quoting Hansen Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 
1297, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
Here, the District Court determined that, because VICI 
did not present evidence of its efforts to mitigate its damages, 
awarding $7 million based on the 2011 payment would either 
constitute an unfair windfall or a penalty.  The only reasons 
the Court gave for this conclusion were based on (1) a 
misapplication of mitigation principles and (2) an erroneous 
substitution of liquidated-damages principles where no 
liquidated damages provision existed.  The Court reached this 
conclusion without finding—either explicitly or implicitly—
what losses VICI incurred or what costs it avoided as a result 
of the breach.  To find a windfall, the District Court must find 
that VICI’s requested damages exceed its expectation interest.  
Accordingly, the District Court erred in calculating VICI’s 
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expectation damages for the 2011 period.  For these reasons, 
we vacate the District Court’s ruling on VICI’s cross appeal.   
 On remand, the District Court is to consider, in the 
first instance, upon applying the appropriate burden of proof, 
whether to award VICI the additional $7 million or a lesser 
sum based on a proper measure of expectation damages, 
including the deduction of actual costs avoided.  See Savarese 
v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1210 (3d Cir. 1989) (vacating a 
damages award based on erroneous application of 
Pennsylvania law).  The Court shall not consider any 
evidence or argument that VICI failed to mitigate damages, in 
view of our holding that T-Mobile waived this issue. 
IX. Conclusion 
 The District Court’s award of $7 million is affirmed.  
Its decision regarding VICI’s damages resulting from T-
Mobile’s failure to make the 2011 payment is vacated.  The 
case is hereby remanded to reconsider the 2011 damages 
issue in light of this opinion.  On remand, the District Court 
should also consider the proper award of attorney’s fees to 
VICI in light of its reassessment of the 2011 damages issue.  
Should there be any further appeals in this matter, they should 
be referred to this panel. 
